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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY-MEANING OF "PERMISSION" IN
OMNIBUS CLAUSE-Plaintiff's car was damaged in a collision with a truck
driven by W, owned by M, and insured in the name of M by defendant. The
policy contained an omnibus clause extending coverage to "any person legally
using or operating the ['motor vehicle] with the permission, express or implied,
of such owner." S had general charge of the truck, as an employee of M, and
had previously used it for his own purposes to the knowledge of M, who made
no objection. At the time of the accident, S was returning from a tavern with
W, another employee of M, and S,"under the influence of liquor, and feeling
too sleepy to drive, had asked W to take the wheel. The trial court rendered
judgment for plaintiff against defendant insurer. Held, affirmed. The evidence warranted the conclusion that S had M's implied permission to use the

RECENT DECISIONS

truck at the time of the collision. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Cook, (Va. 1947) 43 S.E. (2d) 863.
.
The common omnibus clauses in automobile insurance policies extend coverage to persons operating the car ~ith the permission of the owner. Some clauses,
as in the principal case, use the words "express or implied permission," which
precludes any question as to whether or not the permission may be implied, but
the courts have held that when the words "permission" or "knowledge and
consent" appear without definition, they may be read as if the word "implied"
preceded them.1 When the permission relied upon is "express" it must be
shown to have been directly and distinctly stated and not merely left to inference. 2
Whatever the nature of the permission, a mutuality of agreement must exist; 3
but an implied permission is not confined to affirmative action and is usually
shown by usage and practice, known to both parties and not objected to. In
regard to deviation from the purpose and use for which the permission was
granted, the courts have taken three views. First there is the strict or "conversion" rule: for the use of the car to be with the permission of the assured within
the meaning of the omnibus clause, the permission, express or implied, must have
been given not only to the use of it in the first instance, but also to the particular
use being made of the car at the time in question.4 The car must have been
used for a purpose reasonably within the scope of the time limits expressed, and
within the geographical limits contemplated. The court in the principal case
stated that it was following this view, and held that the trial court's holding was
warranted by the evidence. Another view is the liberal or "Hell or High Water"
rule: the bailee need only to have recived permission to take the vehicle in the
first instance~ and any use while it remains in his possession is "with permission"
though that use may be for a purpose not contemplated by the assured when he
parted with possession of the vehicle. 5 The courts following this view do so on
the theory that the insurance contract is as much for the benfit of the public as it
1 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Chandler, 89 N.H. 95, 193 A. 233 (1937); Md.
Casualty Co. v. Roman, (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) 37 F. (2d) 449; Bro v. Standard Accident
Ins. Co., 194 Wis. 293, 215 N.W. 431 (1927): See 72 A.L.R. 1398 (1931) .
• 2 Hinton v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N.A., 175 Va. 205, 8 S.E. (2d) 279 (1940).
8 Kazdan v. St~in, 26 Ohio App. 455, 160 N.E. 506 (1927), affirmed, u8 Ohio
St. 217, 160 N.E. 704 (1928).
4 Trotter v. Union Indemnity Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1929.) 35 F. (2d) 104; Kazdan
v. Stein, 26 Ohio App. 455, 160 N.E. 506 (1927); affirmed, u8 Ohio St. 217, 160
N.E. 704 (1928}; Sauriolle v. O'Gorman, 86 N.H. 39, 163 A. 717 (1932); Mycek
v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 128 Conn. 140, 20 A. {2d) 735 (1941);
Johnson v. Am. Auto Ins. Co., 131 Me. 288, 161 A. 496 (1932); Powers v. Wells,
n5 Pa. Super. 549, 176 A. 62 (1935). Also see 72 A.L.R. 1403 (1931).
5 Stovall v. N.Y. Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W. (2d) 473 (1928};
Jefson v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., 293 Ill. App. 97, II N.E. (2d) 993
(1937); Perrodin v. Thibodeaux, {La. App. 1939) 191 S. 148; Dickinson v. Md.
Casualty Co., IOI Conn. 369, 125 A. 866 (1924). Also in this connection see
Trotter v. Union Indemnity Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 104, and Denny v.
Royal Indemnity Co., 26 Ohio App. 566, 159 N.E. 107 (1927). If the use is permissive at the outset, violations of the permission are immaterial. Stovall v. N.Y. Indemnity Co., 157 Tenn. 301, 8 S.W. {2d) 473 (1938}; Cocos v. American Auto
Insurance Co., 302 Ill. App. 442, 24 N.E. {2d) 75 (1939).
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is for the assured and it is undesirable to permit litigation as to the deatils of the
permission and use. The third rule is the moderate or "Minor Deviation" rule: a
slight deviation from the scope of the authority or permission granted will not be
sufficient to exclude the operator from the coverage under the omnibus clause.a
This view is obviously difficult of application, because the question to be answered
is whether the deviation from the authorized use was slight or gross, and that
turns on the facts of each case. The extent of the deviation in actual distance, 7
the purpose for which the vehicle was lent,8 and other factors, must be taken
into consideration. Despite these apparent difficulties, this rule appears to be
the most sensible of the three.

A. E. Anderson, S.Ed.

a Lloyds America v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 88 P. (2d) 356 (1939);
Peterson v. Maloney, 181 Minn. 437, 232 N.W. 790 (1930); Rikowski v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co. of N.Y., u6 N.J.L. 503, 185 A. 473 (1936), affd., 189 A. 102
(1937). See also Vezolles v. Home Indemnity Co. of N.Y., (D.C. Ky. 1941) 38 F.
Supp. 455, affd., (C.C.A. 6th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 257.
7 Dicki,ns~n v. Md. Casualty Co., IOI Conn. 369, 125 A. 866 (1924).
8 Lloyds Amer'ica v. Tinkelpaugh, 184 Okla. 413, 89 P. (2d) 356 (1939).
9 The accident occurred when the operator had gone only ten blocks from his
~uthorized course.

